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NOTE
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND
OVERSIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL
FISHERY AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF. 1976
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 19761 repre-
sents an attempt by Congress to deal with the problem of the exploited
but unmanaged fishery resources off the coasts of the United States.
2
One of the most important elements of the new management scheme
is the ability to control the volume of foreign fishing in the newly es-
tablished 200-mile fishery conservation zone.3 Instrumental in such
control is the requirement that the Secretary of State negotiate inter-
national fishery agreements and renegotiate existing treaties with na-
tions wishing to fish within the new zone.4 Any foreign fishing within
the fishery conservation zone is to be conducted pursuant to treaties or
to governing international fishery agreements (GIFA's) containing
binding commitments by foreign nations to comply with certain statu-
tory conditions.5 Once the GIFA's have been negotiated, the President
is required to submit them to Congress. 6 If an agreement is disap-
1. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801-1882 (West Supp. 1977).
2. One of the principal purposes of the Act is to stop the depletion of fishery re-
sources caused by foreign vessels fishing adjacent to the United States coasts. Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) § 2(a)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1977).
3. The "fishery conservation zone" is defined as "a zone contiguous to the territorial
sea of the United States," the outer boundary of which is approximately 200 miles
from the coast. Id. § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811.
4. Id. § 202, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822. If a treaty is not renegotiated within "a reason-
able period of time," the Act states that it is the "sense of Congress" that the United
States will withdraw from that treaty in accordance with its provisions. Id. § 202(b),
16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(b).
5. The Act specifies that each "governing international fishery agreement" must
acknowledge the exclusive fishery management authority of the United States as set
forth in the Act and comply with a number of terms and conditions specifically enu-
merated therein. Id. § 20 1(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 182 1(c).
6. The Act sets forth the following mechanisms for congressional review of the
GIFA's:
(a) No governing international fishery agreement shall become effective with re-
spect to the United States before the close of the first 60 calendar days of contin-
uous session of the Congress after the date on which the President transmits to
the House of Representatives and to the Senate a document setting forth the text
of such governing international fishery agreement. . ..
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proved within sixty days of submission by a joint "fishery agreement
resolution" originating in either House of Congress, it will not take
effect. 7
These provisions raise questions regarding the respective powers of
the President and Congress in conducting the nation's foreign affairs.
This note will examine three aspects of governing international fishery
agreements as they reflect on the nature of those powers: (1) congres-
sional power to authorize the agreements, (2) the delegation of legisla-
tive authority, and (3) congressional oversight of the GIFA's by use of
the legislative veto.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO AUTHORIZE GIFA'S
It is expressed as the "sense of Congress" that the GIFA's "include
a binding commitment, on the part of such foreign nation and its
fishing vessels," to comply with specified conditions of the Act.8 The
use of the term "sense of Congress" indicates that the formation and
control of international fishery agreements is not clearly within the
power of Congress. 9 This uncertainty derives from the indefinite ap-
plication of the separation of powers doctrine in the field of foreign
affairs.
(b) Any document described in subsection (a) . . . shall be immediately re-
ferred in the House of Representatives to the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, and in the Senate to the Committees on Commerce and Foreign Rela-
tions.
Id. § 203, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1823 (captions omitted).
7. The Act provides as follows:
[T] he term "fishery agreement resolution" refers to a joint resolution of either
House of Congress-
(A) the effect of which is to prohibit the entering into force and effect of any
governing international fishery agreement the text of which is transmitted to the
Congress pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; and
(B) which is reported from the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Commerce or the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate . ...
Id. § 203(d)(2). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1823(d)(2). See note 66 infra.
8. Id. § 20 1(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c).
9. The term "sense of Congress" is generally used when the matter in question is
in an area of uncertain power distribution between the President and Congress. e.g.,
the negotiation of international agreements. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §
2132(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975) (expressing "sense of Congress" that President seek mod-
ifications in international agreements regarding balance of payment adjustments);
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 22 U.S.C. § 2182a (Supp. V 1975) ("sense of Con-
gress" that authority conferred by the Act be used to establish programs in Latin
America to set up private banks and lending organizations). Similar expressions are
used in foreign assistance provisions. See id. §§ 2194(a)(4)(A), 2225 (Supp. V 1975).
496
International Fishery Agreements
A. Constitutional Framework for Power To Act in Foreign Affairs
The doctrine of separation of powers, fundamental to the constitu-
tional structure, 10 presents an irregular, uncertain division in the area
of foreign relations. 1 The only independent presidential powers
granted under the bare constitutional framework are the authority to
receive ambassadors 12 and to act as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces.' 3 The additional allocated powers of making treaties
and appointing ambassadors require the advice and consent of the
Senate. 14 In contrast to this narrow delineation of presidential powers,
the Constitution sketches a somewhat broader legislative authority for
Congress in the realm of foreign relations: Congress has the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations,' 5 to define offenses against
the law of nations,' 6 to declare war,' 7 and to raise and support arm-
ies.' 8
Despite the limited scope of the President's constitutionally enumer-
ated power in foreign affairs, his preeminence led the Supreme Court,
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,'9 to declare that the
President is the "sole organ"20 of the government responsible for for-
10. See, e.g., Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments,
I HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 13 (1974).
I1. The history of foreign relations is replete with attempts to delineate clearly the
powers of the President and of Congress and to define what constitutes usurpation by
either governmental branch. See note 33 infra.
The struggle between the two branches results in part from the constitutional provi-
sions that confer certain powers upon both the President and Congress, but do not give
either branch decisive authority: "[T] he Constitution, considered only for its affirma-
tive grants of powers which are capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to strug-
gle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (2d ed. 1941).
For sources concerning the foreign relations power of the United States, see C. BUT-
LER, THE TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1902); E. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS (1922).
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
13. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
14. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15. Id. art.1, § 8, cl. 3.
16. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
17. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
18. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
19. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
20. The Court quoted John Marshall, who later became Chief Justice: "The Pres-
ident is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations." 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). Marshall made this remark
as a Congressman in support of the President's extradition of a man charged with
murder. The President, who took the action without a judicial hearing under the pro-
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eign relations. This statement, however, must be placed in its proper
perspective. Curtiss-Wright was a case dealing with a broad delega-
tion of legislative power to the President in the field of foreign af-
fairs. 2 ' The Court upheld the delegation on the principle that federal
power in the foreign affairs arena rests on a different and more exclu-
sive basis than federal power in domestic affairs.22 Thus, the broad
assertions of presidential authority constituted dicta.23
In fact, the power of Congress to participate in foreign affairs com-
pares favorably with the corresponding authority of the Executive.
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress, in addition to its
enumerated powers, 24 has the authority to deal with matters of do-
mestic concern that have international consequences. 25 The "neces-
visions of an existing treaty, had been attacked on the ground that this was a matter
for the courts to decide. The participation of Congress in foreign affairs was not in-
volved. Marshall asserted that the demand for extradition could only be made on the
President, who was free to respond unless Congress authorized the mode of compli-
ance. Thus, Marshall seemed to regard even this exercise of the President's power as
subject to congressional control. See Berger. The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign
Relations, 71 MicH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1972). One commentator has stated: "Clearly,
what Marshall had foremost in mind was simply the President's role as instrument of
commttnication with other governments." E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS 208 (2d ed. 1941) (emphasis in original).
21. War had broken out between Paraguay and Bolivia in 1932. Congress passed
a joint resolution which provided that the President, if he found that prohibiting the
sale of arms would help to establish peace, could proclaim an embargo on American
arms shipments to these two nations. The President issued an embargo proclamation.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., indicted for violating the embargo, raised the defense
that the joint resolution unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the execu-
tive. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304. 307-08 (1936).
22. The Court had recently invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act. ch.
90, §§ 1-304, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), as constituting an impermissible delegation of leg-
islative power to the President. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934). In order to uphold the
congressional action in Curtiss-Wright, it was necessary to distinguish delegations of
power in foreign affairs from those in domestic situations. The Court found that the
powers of the federal government in foreign affairs did not derive from the Constitu-
tion, but were inherent in the nation as an attribute of sovereignty. Thus. somewhat
broader delegations were held to be permissible.
23. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Senate
Conin. ont Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 485, 495-96 & n.47 (1971) (state-
ment of Secretary of State William P. Rogers); Borchard. The Attorney General's
Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 690. 691
(1940).
24. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra. Even the independent power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief is subject to the congressional powers in art. I, § 8.
to declare war (cl. II), to raise and support armies (cl. 12). to provide and maintain
a navy (cl. 13), and to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval forces" (cl. 14).
25. Included within this category are the congressional powers to exclude aliens.
to regulate immigration, and to limit the freedom of action of American citizens in the
interests of the nation's foreign relations. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299
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sary and proper" clause of the Constitution also may furnish a foun-
dation for implied congressional powers in foreign affairs. 26 The ex-
tensive constitutional authority delegated to Congress has even been
described as constituting a "foreign affairs power" to legislate on mat-
ters of international concern.27
(1915) (deprivation of citizenship for having married alien); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (deportation of aliens); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (exclusion of Chinese laborers from United States); The Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (power to regulate immigration, based on Con-
gress foreign commerce power).
26. The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to "make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The
Supreme Court has stated in dictum that "Congress has broad power under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause to enact legislation for the regulation of foreign affairs. Lat-
itude in this area is necessary to ensure effectuation of this indispensable function of
government." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (holding
statutes divesting American of citizenship for evading military service unconstitutional
for violating due process guarantees).
In the War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. V 1975),
Congress relied upon the necessary and proper clause for its authority to limit the
President's use of troops. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated:
It is also of great importance to note that the residual legislative authority over
the entire domain of foreign policy-not just the war power-was placed in Con-
gress by the Constitution. . . .Strictly interpreted, the "necessary and proper"
clause entrusts the Congress not only to "carry into execution" its own constitu-
tional war power, but also, should it be thought necessary, to define and codify
the powers of the government as a whole, including those of the President as its
principal officer.
S. REP.-No. 606, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972).
27. The principal architect of the concept that Congress has a "foreign affairs
power" is Professor Louis Henkin. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1972); Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of
the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1959); Henkin, Tile Treaty
Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1151
(1956).
This power can be traced through the development of authority to regulate aliens.
In the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), the Court upheld the power of
Congress to exclude Chinese laborers on the basis of the United States inherent sov-
ereign power to provide security against foreign aggression through legislative action.
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the same "sovereign power"
was held to authorize alien deportation: "The power to exclude or to expel aliens,
being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments
of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by Act of Congress ..... Id.
at 713 (emphasis added). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (in-
validating Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act on the ground that it was preempted
by federal legislation).
The language of these cases indicates that the power to act in foreign relations is
derived from the sovereign status of the United States in international affairs, and that
this power is not vested in any one branch of the federal government. Cf. De Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890) (upholding Treaty of 1800 allowing French
citizens to take land by descent in the District of Columbia). Thus, the power of
Congress to deal with matters of international concern may derive from the same
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B. Treaties and Other International Agreements
Treaties, which require the participation of both the President and
the Senate, are the only form of international compact provided for
in the Constitution. 28 Nevertheless, it has become common practice
for the federal government to formulate international obligations
through the use of other types of agreements not specifically authorized
by the Constitution2 9-- that is, the executive agreement and the con-
gressional-executive agreement.
Executive agreements are negotiated and concluded on the sole
authority of the President and do not require Senate consent. 30 They
source as the treaty-making power and may be coextensive therewith. See notes 44-46
and accompanying text infra.
It is interesting to note parenthetically that Madison, focusing on the powers of
Congress to regulate foreign commerce and declare war, believed that under the con-
stitutional framework activity in foreign affairs should be predominantly legislative in
character. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138, 147-50 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
28. The Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Senate may reject a treaty in its
entirety, delay action until desired changes have been made, or consent to ratification
provided specific amendments are included. See S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING
AND ENFORCEMENT 81 (2d ed. 1916).
The choice not to vest the treaty-making power solely in the hands of the President
was based on the consideration that "it would be utterly unsafe and improper to in-
trust that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration." THE FEDERALIST No.
75 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 449, 451 (Mentor ed. 1961).
The power to make treaties was envisioned to be a combined function of two branches.
with the Senate representing the interests of the individual states. Id. at 452.
29. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.. 299 U.S. 304 (1936), Justice
Sutherland stated that the power to make international agreements derives from the
very sovereignty of this nation in foreign affairs:
[T] he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sov-
ereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution ...
[T] he power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties
in the constitutional sense .... [which is not] expressly affirmed by the Constitu-
tion, nevertheless exist[s] as inherently inseparable from the conception of na-
tionality.
Id. at 318-19. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 117, Comment c. For another analysis supporting the constitution-
ality of international agreements other than treaties, see McDougal & Lans, Treaties
atd Congressional-Execttive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 216, 240 (1945).
The debate on the use of international agreements has been taken up by various
authors. See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MIcH. L.
REV. 1 (1972); Fitzgerald, Executive Agreements and the Intent Behind the Treaty
Power, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757 (1975); Note. Executive Agreements, The Treaty-
Making Clause, and Strict Constructionism, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 587 (1975).
30. In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the Court held that the Lit-
vinov Assignment, an executive agreement not previously authorized by statute or
treaty but entered into by the President pursuant to his independent constitutional
powers. had "as much legal validity and obligation as if [it] proceeded from the leg-
islature" and was as much a " 'Law of the Land'" as a treaty. Id. at 230. See also
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generally are used in dealing with single events or matters of tempo-
rary concern.31 Congressional-executive agreements, on the other
hand, occur when Congress authorizes the Executive to enter into an
international agreement on a subject which falls within Congress con-
stitutional authority. 32
Both types of agreements have equal validity for the purpose of
binding the nation to an international commitment. However, con-
gressional involvement is totally lacking in the formation of executive
agreements.33 In contrast, congressional-executive agreements, such as
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding the supremacy of the Lit-
vinov Agreement over contrary state policy).
Several commentators have concluded that art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, which
vests the "executive power" in the President, provides the principal constitutional basis
for interpreting the presidential power to make executive agreements. See S. CRANDALL,
TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 102 (2d ed. 1916); Levitan, Executive
Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 35 ILL. L. REV. 365 (1940). But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Although no court has ever held that the President may not conclude executive
agreements pursuant to his independent constitutional powers, one court has indicated
that these agreements may not relate to matters that fall within Congress constitu-
tional powers. In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955), the court struck down an executive
agreement between the United States and Canada concerning the export and import
of potatoes. The court held that Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate for-
eign commerce, and thus the President cannot make any executive agreement which
falls within this area.
31. See Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L.
REV. 751, 755 (1939).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 120 (1965) delineates the scope of congressional-executive agreements:
An international agreement made by the United States as an executive agreement
authorized by an act of Congress may ... deal with any matter that falls within
any of the powers of the Congress and the President under the Constitution, even
if the matter also falls within the treaty power.
33. The exclusion of congressional participation has prompted Congress to regis-
ter its concern and displeasure on numerous occasions. See, e.g., S. 1251, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) (provision for Senate disapproval of executive agreements); S. 632,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (provision for disapproval by concurrent resolution);
S. 3830, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (provision for disapproval by concurrent reso-
lution); S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (same); Pub. L. No. 92-403, § 1, 86
Stat. 619 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. V 1975)) (requiring all international
agreements to be submitted to Congress). See also Congressional Oversight of Execu-
tive Agreements-1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); Congressional
Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Interna-
tional Executive Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972).
The most recent activity in Congress aimed at restricting executive agreements is
the Treaty Powers Resolution which would require most significant executive agree-
ments to be submitted as treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. S. Res. 24,
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the GIFA's, provide Congress with a role in the determination of for-
eign policy through the authorization of international agreements. 34
C. Congressional-Executive Agreements as the Basis for
Authorization of GIFA's
Congressional-executive agreements, like treaties and executive
agreements, become the "law of the land. '35 However, because Con-
gress has no independent power to negotiate directly with foreign gov-
ernments, its constitutional authority to initiate these agreements is
limited. Only when Congress has legislative power over the subject
matter at issue can it make use of the presidential function of negoti-
ating with foreign governments. 36 Accordingly, congressional-executive
agreements involving matters within Congress enumerated powers
have met with judicial approval. 37
Among these enumerated constitutional powers is the power to reg-
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The same resolution was introduced and hearings were
held in the 94th Congress. See Treaty Powers Resolution: Hearings on S. Res. 486
Before the Senate Comn. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
34. Congress has authorized the executive branch to conclude international agree-
ments since the early days of the nation. For example, in 1790 it empowered the Pres-
ident to borrow money from foreign countries to pay off the Revolutionary War
Debt, ch. 34. § 2. I Stat. 138 (1790). Subsequent congressional-executive agreements
have been used to conduct foreign trade, e.g., Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970); and to sell or lease defense material to foreign gov-
ernments, e.g., Lend-Lease Act of 1941, ch. 11, § 3, 55 Stat. 31 (1941). See also 19
U.S.C. § 2131(b) (Supp. V 1975) (foreign trade); 39 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) (postal
agreements); 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1970) (atomic energy agreements).
35. See, e.g., Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882); United States v. 18
Packages of Dental Instruments, 222 F. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1915); Mihalovitch, Fletcher
& Co. v. United States, 160 F. 988 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1908); United States v. Luyties,
130 F. 333 (2d Cir. 1904).
Furthermore, congressional-executive agreements supersede inconsistent state and
federal laws as well as prior inconsistent treaties and executive agreements. L. HENKIN.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1972); 40 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 469 (1946)
(stating that congressional-executive agreement would be equivalent to treaty and
would constitute supreme law of the land).
36. The scope of an agreement executed pursuant to congressional authorization
is limited by the "collective powers of the Congress and of the President." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 120, Comment a
(1965). See note 32 supra.
37. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding constitutionality of Tariff
Act provision authorizing President to suspend import duty exemptions on articles
unless reciprocity could be obtained with other nations); Cotzhausen v. Nazro. 107
U.S. 215 (1882) (upholding congressional-executive agreement to create postal con-
ventions under congressional power to establish post offices, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
7); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 268 (Cust. Ct. 1958). aff'd,
275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (sustaining validity of Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934.
which empowered President to enter into foreign trade agreements as legitimate con-
502
International Fishery Agreements
ulate commerce with foreign nations.38 Fishing within the "fishery
conservation zone" and removing fish to a foreign country constitute
the movement of goods and therefore should qualify as "commerce. '39
Even if this interpretation were subject to doubt, one could forcefully
argue that the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of commerce
in the interstate setting is equally applicable to foreign commerce. 40
Thus, Congress appears to have the authority under the foreign com-
merce power to authorize and delineate the contents of GIFA's and to
require that existing fishery treaties be renegotiated to conform with
the provisions of the Act.
gressional enactment pursuant to constitutional powers to lay and collect duties and
to regulate commerce). In Star-Kist, a concurring judge cited Field for the proposition
that Congress has "the authority to authorize and and empower the President, under pre-
scribed standards and upon specified limitations upon his discretion, to negotiate and
conclude reciprocal trade agreements and to make them effective by proclamation."
169 F. Supp. at 287 (Mollison, J., concurring). The actual holding in each case was
that the relevant statute was neither an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
nor a violation of the treaty-making clause.
38. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. The term "commerce" denotes not only the exchange of goods for other goods
or for money, but also the movement of goods. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118
U.S. 557, 574 (1886). One court has stated that the "[t] ransportation of ... fish to
.. market at ... [specified) cities from the high seas and territorial waters is com-
merce," and fishermen who provided the fish "were engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce." Local 36 of Int'l Fishermen & Allied Workers of America v. United
States, 177 F.2d 320, 326 (9th Cir. 1949).
40. The scope of Congress power over domestic commerce is illustrated by the
decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which sustained federal author-
ity to regulate the production of goods intended not for commerce but only for con-
sumption on the farm. The Court held that even if the activity were local it could be
reached by Congress if it exerted a substantial economic impact on interstate com-
merce. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (sustaining provision of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited racial discrimination in restaurants serving
interstate travelers or in which substantial part of food served moved in interstate
commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to hotel which practiced racial discrimination on
grounds that such discrimination placed burden on interstate commerce); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding power to prohibit shipment of goods
in interstate commerce if manufactured by employees whose wages were less than
statutory minimum); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (upholding stat-
ute which prohibited misbranding of drugs after shipment in interstate commerce).
Chief Justice Marshall provided a similarly expansive reading of congressional power
to control foreign commerce when he stated that it "comprehend [s] every species of
commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824).
Arguably, these decisions are inapposite. Whereas the issue presented in the above
cases was whether Congress exercise of the power to regulate commerce was an un-
constitutional encroachment on the sovereignty of the individual states, the present
concern is whether such an exercise unconstitutionally infringes on the power of the
Executive. The controversy in the former instance centers on principles of federalism;
the latter concern is with separation of powers. Nevertheless, the federal-state contro-
versy which has produced these sweeping rules at least provides analogic support for
the asserted proposition.
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Additional support for congressional power to regulate foreign
fishing activity within the fishery conservation zone might possibly be
found in the property clause of the Constitution, which provides that
"Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States." 4' In a recent case the Supreme Court stated that
"while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property
Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly
observed '[t]hat the power over the public land thus entrusted to
Congress is without limitations.' ",42 Although the managed fishery
resources within the fishery conservation zone are neither within the
territory of the United States nor on public lands, the Act's assertion
of exclusive management jurisdiction from the edge of the territorial
sea out to 200 miles may provide a sufficient "property" interest in the
fishery resources to justify congressional control of foreign fishing
within the conservation zone.43
The concept of a congressional "foreign affairs power"44 further
substantiates the authority of Congress to act in the area of interna-
tional fishing. Because treaties and congressional-executive agree-
ments constitute equally valid means of forming international obliga-
tions, 45 the power of Congress to authorize congressional-executive
agreements arguably extends to all matters that are within the nation's
treaty power, i.e., to any matter of international concern which affects
41. Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
42. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, petition for rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct.
189 (1976) (upholding federal statute regulating wild horses and burros on public
lands). For a discussion of the Court's broad interpretation of the property clause.
see Note, Expansion of National Power Under the Property Clause: Federal Regula-
tion of Wildlife, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 181 (1977).
43. It is doubtful, however, whether the property c--e would be sufficient to jus-
tify the asserted jurisdiction over anadromous species oeyond the fishery conservation
zone, as such fish are completely beyond the United States geographic jurisdictional
claim. FCMA § 102, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812 (West Supp. 1977).
44. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
45. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1972). The
Supreme Court's decision in B. Altman & Co. v. United States. 224 U.S. 583 (1912),
indicates that congressional-executive agreements and treaties may be interchangeable
constitutional practices. The Court held that although such an agreement was "not
technically a treaty requiring ratification," nevertheless
it was an international compact, negotiated between the representatives of two sov-
ereign nations and made in the name of and on behalf of the contracting countries,
and dealing with important commercial relations between the two countries, and
was proclaimed by the President .... We think such a compact is a treaty under
the Circuit Court of Appeals Act . . ..
Id. at 601. See also Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882) (declaring that postal
conventions have equal status with treaties as part of the law of the land).
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the United States.46 Thus, as there is little doubt that fishing rights are
the proper subject of treaties, 47 they constitute appropriate subject
matter for congressional-executive agreements.
II. DELEGATION OF POWER
When Congress authorizes another branch of the federal govern-
ment to act for it, a question arises as to whether such authorization
constitutes an impermissible delegation of a legislative function.48 The
concept of separation of powers prevents each branch from abdicating
its authority by assigning it to another branch.49 In domestic situa-
tions, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress, after defining poli-
cies and establishing standards, may leave factfinding and subordinate
rulemaking to other branches. 50
Due to the nature of international negotiations, the Court has rec-
ognized that a broader delegation of authority to the President in the
area of foreign relations is often necessary. 51 Thus, although acknowl-
edging that some specifications of standards and limitations are still
46. The Reporter's Note to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 120 (1965) states:
[DI] elegated powers of the Congress under the Constitution are so extensive and
so broadly interpreted by the courts as to suggest that Congress, acting under such
powers (including the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I, section 8) can
authorize the President to make an executive agreement relating to any matter of
international concern.
47. See, e.g., Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.
285.
48. See generally Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Com-
petence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 307 (1976).
49. For example, the Supreme Court has held that "Congress is not permitted to
abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is...
vested." Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
50. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (upholding statute granting
an administrative body authority to formulate rules for home loan banks); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding statutory authorization to Office of
Price Administration to fix the maximum price of rents and services); United States
v. Rock Royal Co-op Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) (upholding statute authorizing Sec-
retary of Agriculture to fix price of certain commodities).
The Court, however, has invalidated delegations of unqualified presidential authority.
In Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934), the Court struck down a provision
of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which authorized the President to
prohibit the transportation of petroleum in interstate and foreign commerce. See also
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating NIRA
provision authorizing President to approve "codes of fair competition").
51. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936),
the Court stated: "[C] ongressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President
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required,5 2 the Court has never invalidated any legislative authoriza-
tion for the Executive to conclude international agreements on the
grounds of unconstitutional delegation. 53 Under the Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act, Congress has circumscribed the authori-
zation for the executive branch to negotiate GIFA's, not only by im-
posing conditions and guidelines,5 4 but also by requiring submission
of negotiated agreements for final congressional approval. 55 The Act
has thus harnessed the delegation of legislative authority with stricter
supervisory checks than are necessary to withstand an attack of im-
permissible delegation.
III. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF GIFA'S-THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO
Although there are sufficient guidelines to satisfy any delegation of
power objections, the provision of the Act that requires the transmis-
sion of GIFA's to Congress may be challenged as legislative usurpa-
tion of an executive function in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 56 Section 203 of the Act requires the President to submit any
negotiated GIFA to Congress; these GIFA's become effective unless
disapproved within sixty days by a "fishery agreement resolution."57
a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be ad-
missible were domestic affairs alone involved." See also id. at 321-22; J.W. Hampton
Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding provision of Tariff Act
of 1922 as valid delegation of power); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891) (holding
that President acting under authority of tariff act was simply acting as agent of
Congress); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 268 (Cust. Ct. 1958),
affd, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
In some cases dealing with delegations which impinge on individual rights, the more
stringent limitations of the domestic cases may apply. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958) (striking down delegation to Secretary of State of authority to limit
travel by citizens outside United States on basis of beliefs and associations).
52. For example, in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965), the Court stated
that " [Curtiss-Wright] does not mean that simply because a statute deals with foreign
relations, it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice." See also
Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
53. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 118-20 (1972); L.
JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 70-71 (1976).
54. FCMA § 201(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c) (West Supp. 1977).
55. Id. § 203, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1823.
56. Article I of the Constitution vests the legislative power in the Congress and
article II vests the executive power in the President. James Madison stated in this
regard: "The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself
make a law, though he can put a negative on every law .... The entire legislature
... can exercise no executive prerogative ...." THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
reprinted in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 303 (Mentor ed. 1961).
57. See note 7 supra.
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Provisions of this nature have been characterized as "legislative
vetoes." 58 In general, such provisions deny the effectiveness of execu-
tive action taken pursuant to congressional-executive agreements if
either or both Houses of Congress pass a resolution of disapproval. 59
Two constitutional objections to the use of the legislative veto have
been advanced. First, it excludes the President from his proper role in
the legislative process by preventing his use of the executive veto.60
Second, it allows the legislature to intrude on the executive function of
carrying out and implementing previously enacted legislation. 61
The first objection is based on the principle that the Constitution
vests the veto power over legislation exclusively with the President.62
Once an act has been passed by Congress and signed by the President,
the Constitution provides for no further congressional activity. The
legislative veto, however, does allow Congress to exercise subsequent
control over the subject matter. Furthermore, it "often takes the form
58. See J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS (1977);
Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
467 (1962); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Reso-
lutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Newman & Keeton, Congress
and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?,
41 CAL. L. REV. 568 (1953); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional
Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983 (1975); 37 Op. A-r'Y GEN. 56 (1933).
The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to adjudicate Congress use of the
legislative veto on constitutional grounds. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
the issue was explicitly raised by the parties, but the Court disposed of the case on other
grounds.
59. See, e.g., Military Construction Authorization Act of 1967, 10 U.S.C. § 2662
(1970) (no military installation to be closed until 30 days after Secretary of Defense
reports to Congress); Atomic Energy Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §9 2153-2154 (1970)
(agreements for nuclear cooperation not to become effective if Congress passes con-
current resolution of disapproval during 60-day period following transmission to com-
mittee). See also notes 63-64 infra; Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (Supp. V
1975); War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. 99 1541-1547 (Supp. V 1975).
Presidents have vetoed bills because of a "legislative veto" provision contained therein.
See 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1279 (Oct. 21, 1974) (President Ford's veto of
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954); H.R. Doc. No. 272, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965) (President Johnson's veto of the Military Construction Bill of 1965);
H.R. Doc. No. 133, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (President Truman's veto of the De-
fense Land Transfer Bill of 1951). For an extensive catalogue of statutes in which the
legislative veto has been authorized, see Watson, supra note 58, at 1089-94.
60. See, e.g., C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 330-32 (2d ed. 1968).
61. SeeJ. BOLTON, supra note 58, at 31.
62. Art. I, § 7, states:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the
same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives ....
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of a simple resolution of one House 63 or a concurrent resolution of
both Houses, 64 neither of which is subject to a presidential veto. 65
However, this objection is not applicable to the Act. Section 203 spe-
cifically defines a fishery agreement resolution to be a joint resolu-
tion,66 requiring it to be submitted to the President for a possible
veto,67 and thus preventing Congress from legislating in an unconsti-
tutional manner. 68
63. For examples of statutes providing for simple resolutions, see Reorganization
Act of 1949, 5 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1970); Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.
22 U.S.C. § 2587 (1970); Act ofJune 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 414.
64. Examples of statutes providing for concurrent resolutions can be found in the
Export Import Bank Amendments of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 635(e) (Supp. V 1975);
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193 (Supp. V 1975); Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153-2154 (1970); Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, ch.
626, § 405(d), 63 Stat. 718 (repealed 1954).
65. It has been suggested that the President waives objections to the legislative veto
by signing legislation that embodies the mechanism. See Cooper & Cooper. supra note
58. at 478; Sale, Constitutional and International Legal Implications of the Proposed
Marine Fisheries Conservation Act of 1975. reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 847, 848-49 (Comm.
Print 1976). However, the general consensus appears to be that "no matter what the
President does, his actions cannot protect the legislative veto if it is otherwise invalid."
J. BOLTON, supra note 58, at 30. This view is implicit in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I
(1976) (presidential appointment power).
66. FCMA § 203(d)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1823(d)(2) (West Supp. 1977). This ter-
minology is somewhat ambiguous because a joint resolution is. by definition, an action
of both Houses of Congress. See note 67 infra. It is reasonably certain that the word-
ing contemplates a resolution which originates in either House and is then submitted
to the other House for consideration and approval.
Section 206 of H. R. 200, the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act of 1975, a precursor
of the Act, authorized a "resolution of disapproval" of either House of Congress. See
H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 58-60 (1975). In a memo concerning H.R.
200 to Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Michael Uhlmann, Assistant Attorney General, stated: "Nor in
our view can Congress prevent executive agreements from coming into force by a res-
olution of disapproval passed by a simple majority of either House." Letter from
Assistant Attorney General Michael Uhlmann to Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan
(Feb. 24, 1976) (on file at Washington Law Review). Thus, although there is no
legislative history to help clarify the matter, it seems that the use of the joint resolution
format in the final version of the Act was designed to eliminate this potential problem.
67. A joint resolution "requires the approval of both houses and the signature of
the President, just as a bill does and has the force of law if approved." CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 105-06 (1971). It is
generally used in dealing with matters of limited importance. Id. at 106. See also SEN-
ATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMINISTRATION, SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 15 (1975). Concurrent resolutions "must be passed by both houses but do not
require the signature of the President and do not have the force of law." CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY, su pra at 106. They are generally used for matters affecting the
operations of both houses, such as fixing the time of adjournment. Id. at 106. See also
C. PRITCHETT, supra note 60, at 330.
For a discussion of the development of the use of these various forms of congres-
sional resolutions and their constitutional implications, see Ginnane, supra note 58. at
570-75; Watson, supra note 58, at 995-1000.
68. One critic of the legislative veto has stated: "Once responsibility passes to the
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The second objection to the legislative veto is based generally on
the concept of separation of powers, and particularly on the provision
in article II, section 3 which states that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." The argument is that Congress,
through the use of the legislative veto, is reserving the right to decide
whether or not executive action taken pursuant to the law shall be
carried out, and is therefore attempting to "execute" the laws itself.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that a legislative assumption
of the executive function would violate the separation of powers doc-
trine,69 the Act can be viewed, not as vesting Congress with executive
functions, but as enabling it to retain a measure of control over the
power it has delegated. When the President exercises sanctioned au-
thority, he may be considered the agent of Congress and subject to
those controls deemed necessary by the principal.7 0 Therefore, be-
cause Congress can empower the President to conclude GIFA's, 71 it
arguably may condition the granting of such authority on subsequent
congressional approval.72
This line of reasoning does not fully confront the criticism that
Congress nevertheless acts unconstitutionally when it reserves the
executive, however, Congress cannot take that responsibility back unless it is willing to
submit to the possibility of a presidential veto." J. BOLTON, supra note 58, at 32 (em-
phasis in original). The negative implication of this statement is that if Congress does
provide for such a possibility, as it has through the "fishery agreement resolution"
mechanism, the constitutional issue disappears.
69. In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928), the Supreme Court
stated: "Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to
make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of
such enforcement." In that case the Philippine legislature had created corporations and
retained ownership of most of the stock. The power to vote the stock was vested in a
committee consisting of members of the legislature. The Supreme Court held that
voting the stock was solely an executive function and that delegation of this function to
legislative officers was in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
70. Professor Henkin, in discussing this argument, has stated that under such cir-
cumstances "Congress is not repealing or modifying the original legislation .... Surely
Congress should be able to recapture powers it delegates to the President without the
consent of the agent." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 122 (1972).
See also, Cooper & Cooper, supra note 58, at 475-76.
71. See text accompanying notes 38-47 supra.
72. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 58, at 475-76. Congressman Elliott Levitas
recently stated: 'The fact that Congress, when it passes an act, delegates certain
authority does not mean that it is relinquishing that authority and it can condition the
exercise of that authority by any means it so desires." Improving Congressional Over-
sight of Federal Regulatory Agencies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 192 (1976). See also Congressional Oversight
of Executive Agreements-1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 272-77 (1975)
(memorandum prepared by David M. Sale, Legislative Attorney for the American
Law Division).
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right to decide the manner in which the President may execute the
laws. However, this criticism is not persuasive when applied to the
Act. The uncertain division of foreign affairs powers and the impor-
tance of regulating foreign fishing within the fishery conservation zone
both militate against rigid compartmentalization of legislative and
executive functions. 73 In circumstances which require delegating large
amounts of power to the President, congressional oversight is an ap-
propriate instrument to ensure effective and proper utilization of that
power.74
Finally, it is possible to interpret section 203 of the Act as setting
forth a "report-and-wait" mechanism; 75 that is, the President must
submit the fishery agreement to Congress and then wait a specified
period of sixty days before the agreement goes into effect. Under such
a procedure, executive action is disapproved by enacting new legisla-
tion in the form of fishery agreement resolutions, which are approved
by both Houses and the President.76 Thus, the President is not barred
73. A report on the constitutionality of the Act's congressional veto stated that in
matters such as fishery management, where traditional oversight mechanisms have
proven ineffective, Congress must exercise some type of effective, operative control
unless it is to legislate in prohibitive detail or abdicate its legislative power. LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY. supra note 65, at 849. It then quoted the following passage from Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952):
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot con-
form to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
Id. at 635.
74. The congressional role in prior fishery agreements has been limited to an after-
the-fact examination; the agreements were not subject to ratification because they were
not submitted as treaties. A House report on an earlier version of the Act reported
that, because of the perceived failure of previous agreements,
there is an overwhelming need to insure that the utterly bankrupt negotiating pro-
cedures of the past decade are not repeated after enactment of this Act. No longer
will it be necessary for the United States to go, hat in hand, to foreign capitals to
give concessions in return for minimal recognition of conservation principles by
the many foreign nations fishing off our shores. ...
[T] hese procedures [for congressional review of GIFA's] recognize that
the oversight role of Congress cannot be effectively undertaken unless there is
adequate review and deliberation before these agreements become a reality.
H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1975). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 65, at 1112.
75. See Ginnane, supra note 58, at 577-78, 601-03; J. BOLTON, supra note 58, at
41-43.
76. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
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from the legislative process, and there is no infringement of his execu-
tive function.77
IV. CONCLUSION
The authority of Congress to provide for international fishery
agreements can be based either on its constitutional power to control
foreign commerce or its foreign affairs power in matters of interna-
tional concern. Moreover, the Act's purpose of imposing controls on
both domestic and foreign fishing emphasizes the importance of con-
gressional involvement in the implementation of a total management
program.
This new legislation is significant, not only for its establishment of a
200-mile fishery conservation zone and a management authority, but
also as a reflection of the tension between the Executive and Congress
over the authority to conduct foreign relations.78 The Act's use of the
"legislative veto," although subject to serious constitutional doubts in
some settings, appears defensible from both a constitutional and
policy perspective as a means of retaining some degree of control over
the authority created by the legislation. Although the marked absence
of judicial precedent renders any prediction speculative, it appears
relatively certain that the provisions of the Act pertaining to interna-
tional fishery agreements would survive a constitutional challenge.
E. Susan Crystal
77. Even an outspoken critic of the legislative veto has commented that the "re-
port-and-wait mechanism is probably constitutional" because, "[u] nlike the legislative
veto, it does not exclude the President from the legislative process." J. BOLTON, supra
note 58, at 41. The slight amount of judicial authority appears to be in accord. In
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1940), the Court commented favorably on
the report-and-wait procedure under which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated. In Clark v. Valeo, 45 U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1977), an
action was brought to challenge the legislativd veto provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. The court stated that the report-and-wait procedure was constitutional
before it concluded that the issue of the legislative veto was not in fact ripe for decision.
78. Senator Warren G. Magnuson, one of the prime movers behind the Act, has
stated: "In my view, this legislation presented a classic confrontation between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of our government in the area of foreign affairs."
Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward
Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REv. 427, 438 (1977).
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